The Facts
Member of armed forces becomes candidate in Federal election
The dismissed employee had joined the Army Reserve in 1997. He then transferred to the Australian Army, serving overseas in various locations from 2006-2009 before returning to the Army Reserve, where he held the rank of Major, until the events giving rise to the litigation.
While still in the regular army, he became involved in a right-wing political party, eventually becoming a candidate in a Federal election. Concurrently with that nomination, he launched a webpage, Facebook page and Twitter page to promote his candidature. His webpage identified him as an army officer who had served in the Iraq war.
Anti-gay comments on social media give rise to formal rebuke from employer
The events giving rise to the litigation started when the employee, a staunch Roman Catholic, published comments on proposed amendments to the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, which in the employee’s view had the potential to force the church to permit the hiring of openly homosexual teachers in its schools.
A few days after launching his social media pages, he tweeted: “I wouldn’t let a gay person teach my children and I am not afraid to say it.”
He continued to make his views known at length via his various social media outlets, earning a formal rebuke from his commanding officer, accompanied by a direction not to make further comment.
Media releases accuse ADF of hypocrisy over Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras
A couple of months later, after learning that the Australian Defence Force had approved of ADF members marching in uniform in the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras, the employee issued a series of media releases accusing the ADF of hypocrisy in taking him to task for expressing his religious and political views, while “bending over at every opportunity to help gay members”.
Lest his point not have been clearly understood, he said, among many comments, that “no soldier wants to be led by a commander that has voluntarily had his balls cut off”, in reference to an ADF policy about funding sex change operations.
Employee ordered to remove “offensive and divisive” opinions from social media websites
This earned the employee a very stern rebuke, to the effect that his views were “both offensive and divisive”. This was coupled with an order that he should immediately stop publishing any such material in the public domain which identified him as an army officer, and that he had to remove all such material from his social media sites.
The employee’s response was to challenge the validity of the army’s actions through internal procedures.
Applicant issued with notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed
The crunch came when the employee had an acrimonious public exchange on social media with a transgender officer on the staff of the Chief of Army, described by the Federal Court judge who heard the matter as doing credit to neither participant because of its “intemperate, vitriolic and personally offensive character”.
This was the straw that broke the camel’s back: the employee was issued with a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed. About six months later, his employment was terminated. The employee resorted to internal appeal processes which were unsuccessful. He then applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of the termination decision.
Expert commentary on the court's decision
Free exercise of any religion and freedom of political expression
In the case Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor [2017 ] FCAFC 41, the ADF was the ultimate winner, but not easily.
In the Federal Court, the judge at first instance found for the employee, striking down the army’s decision to terminate his services. The dismissed soldier had relied on the fact that under section 116 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth government is prohibited from (among other things) interfering with the free exercise of religion, or imposing any religious requirement as a test for holding public office.
The employee had argued that to the extent that the army’s processes derived from Commonwealth legislation, he could not be sanctioned for expressing his views, which were informed by his Roman Catholic (or any other) religion.
The dismissed employee had also relied on the findings of the High Court, notably in Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times and Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, that the Constitution contains an implied freedom of political expression, because the electoral process prescribed by the Constitution can only work as intended if people are free to express opinions about matters of political interest.
Upholding the employee’s argument about freedom of political expression, the judge decided that the army was unjustified in dismissing him.
Initial judgment in favour of employee overturned on appeal
However, on appeal by the ADF, it was held that the trial judge had overstated the nature of the “right” of political expression enjoyed by the employee.
The Full Court reversed the original decision, stating that the army had acted lawfully when it issued a direct order to the employee to stop publishing offensive and homophobic views publicly and to remove such material from his social media sites.
The Full Court determined that the army had a right to stop conduct by one of its officers which was damaging to the cohesion, morale, authority and reputation of the army and the ADF generally. Further, the army was entitled to dismiss its employee for disobeying its direct orders.
Growing challenge for employers in an age of social media
In one way, this case is not representative of employment situations generally. It is long-established law that the employment of members of the military does not depend on contract, but on commission from the Crown. Additionally, the constitutional arguments involved here would not ordinarily be available to an employee.
In another way, however, the case illustrates a steadily growing challenge for employers. In an age of rapidly expanding social media usage, what conduct of an employee, on social media and in non-work time, can be taken into account in relation to employment status? Where is the line drawn between conduct as an employee, and private conduct? What tests should be applied to determine if conduct is employment-related or not?